Untitled
Search
•
RSS Feed
Executive Summary
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA),
which offered some significant reforms such as banning unlimited ‘soft
money’ contributions to political parties and clamping down on
electioneering spending by outside interests. Unfortunately, BCRA also
doubled the amount of money that an individual may give to a federal
candidate from $2,000 to $4,000 per election cycle. Proponents of the
bill downplayed the impact of higher contribution limits or even
suggested that they would make congressional elections more
competitive. As the 2006 elections near, we decided to analyze the
impact of raising individual contribution limits on the 2004
congressional and presidential elections.
Using Federal Election
Commission data on federal candidate fundraising from individuals,
parties, and political action committees, we found that BCRA’s doubling
of contribution limits did not deliver the promised benefit of more
competitive elections and may be, in part, responsible for several
harmful emerging trends. Races did not become more competitive; in
fact, incumbents continued to out-raise challengers and win re-election
at high rates. The data show not only a continued electoral dominance
of the largest fundraisers, but also an increase in the disparity
between winners and losers—between candidates with access to wealthy
donors and those without.
Key findings include the following: •
The biggest fundraisers continued to dominate federal elections.
Congressional candidates who raised the most money won their elections
97% of the time—up slightly from 2002. General election winners in 2004
out-raised losers by a margin of 3 to 1.
• The funding gap
between winners and losers in congressional contests widened. In 2004,
winners in congressional elections out-raised losers by $281 million in
individual contributions, an increase of $65 million over 2002. In
contributions of $1,000+, the winners had a $177 million advantage over
their less well-heeled opponents, an increase of $35 million over 2002.
•
Higher contribution limits failed to help challengers. In 2004,
congressional incumbents out-raised challengers $239 million to $61
million in $1,000+ contributions. The incumbent fundraising advantages
fueled a re-election rate of 96% for Senators (up from just under 89%
in 2002) and 98% for members of the House (up slightly from 97% in
2002).
• BCRA’s hard money increases negated the effect of a
promising surge in small donor participation. Individuals contributing
$200 or less gave $146 million more to congressional and presidential
candidates in 2004 than in 2000. But, the overall clout of small donors
did not increase between these two election cycles. Due to $446 million
in additional contributions by large donors, including $345 million in
contributions of at least $1,000, small donors still accounted for just
28% of federal candidates’ individual funds.
• The average
itemized contribution to congressional and presidential candidates
jumped 29% over last cycle, after remaining stable for 15 years.
Itemized contributions to federal candidates averaged $770 this cycle,
up from $599 in 2002 and $598 in 2000. The average increase over the
previous 15 years was just 2% per cycle.
• No evidence suggests
that doubling individual contribution limits reduced fundraising time.
Proponents of increasing the individual contribution limits often
argued that it would reduce the amount of time candidates would have to
spend fundraising. The data from the 2004 election do not support this
assertion. If higher limits reduced fundraising time, we would expect
candidates to raise the “necessary” sum by accepting fewer
contributions in larger amounts. The number of donors who gave itemized
contributions ($200 or more) to congressional candidates continued to
increase this cycle to approximately 517,000, up from approximately
465,000 in 2002.
Higher contribution limits to
candidates and political committees do not help grassroots candidates
or challengers. They do not improve fairness or competition and are
detrimental to achieving the goals of real reform. The myth that such a
change is relatively harmless and, therefore, an easy or acceptable
tradeoff for other reforms threatens the ultimate impact of campaign
finance reform and may well undermine the public’s support and belief
that real reform will ever reduce the influence of money in American
politics.
|